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CAN INTERNATIONAL LAW PROVIDE EXTRA-
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION FOR EXCLUDABLE
ALIENS?
Louis B. Sohn*
By its very nature, since its very beginning the United States has
been a nation of immigrants, first from Europe, later from other
parts of the world. Among them were many refugees, escaping, like
the Pilgrims and Quakers, religious persecution, or from countries
ruled by domestic or foreign tyrants, or in which most inhabitants
were mired in perpetual poverty. Between 1820 and 1985 over 94
million immigrants were admitted.' Until the 1920s, the United States'
doors were open to almost all of them, 2 but after the First World
War one immigration law after another established various restric-
tions. Some additional restrictions were imposed after the Second
World War. The basic immigration legislation of 1917 and 1921 was
revised frequently (especially in 1924, 1952, 1965, 1976, 1978), some-
times for the worse, but more often for the better, and in 1980 a
Special Refugee Act3 was adopted, which was designed to implement
the United States' acceptance of the 1967 Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees. 4 More than 500,000 persons per year have been
admitted to the United States in recent years, many of whom were
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2 But see the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Chae Chan Ping v. United
States (the Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (upholding the validity
under international law of U.S. statutes designed to stem the flow of Chinese
immigrants after the California Gold Rush), and the comment thereon in Louis
Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese
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in fact refugees, though they were able to qualify for admission
without having to rely on their refugee status. As Adlai Stevenson,
then U.S. representative to the United Nations stated in 1961 during
a discussion on Cuban refugees in the General Assembly, "[slo long
as Americans remain a free people, just so long will they uphold the
right of asylum as a fundamental human right. ' 5
This paper focuses on the problems of those who do not qualify
for a regular admission as refugees, but are detained at the entrance
point, or are detained in the United States after being released on
temporary parole or pending repatriation. The thesis I shall try to
defend is that these persons must be treated according to basic rules
of humanitarian law; that they are entitled to be treated as human
beings, regardless of any particular legislation or administrative re-
gulations depriving them of basic legal protection granted to citizens
and regular residents of the country. Justice Stevens pointed out a
few years ago that
In]either the Bill of Rights nor the laws of sovereign States create
the liberty which the Due Process Clause protects .... [I]t [is] self-
evident that all men were endowed by their Creator with liberty as
one of the cardinal inalienable rights. It is that basic freedom which
the Due Process Clause protects, rather than the particular rights
or privileges conferred by specific laws or regulations. 6
It is for liberty that the people of the United States fought the War
of Independence, and the whole history of the United States centers
on the sacredness of this basic freedom.
Nevertheless, the position in the United States of some refugees
(or-as the United States calls them-" detainees") does not reflect
this historic imperative. I would like to explore in some detail how
the United States got itself into this unhappy situation. I shall discuss
in this connection two cases, one involving the Haitian refugees, and
one relating to the Cuban ones.
Traditionally, persons trying to enter the United States and stopped
at the border have had no right to contest the ruling of the immigration
authorities that they are not admissible. When a German "war bride"
of an American soldier tried to enter the United States under a special
1 44 DEPT. ST. BULL. 681, 684 (1961); 8 Whiteman, Dig. Int'l L. 670-71 (1976);
for a critical view of the INS's role in asylum adjudication, in particular, since
passage of The Refugee Act of 1980, see Michael P. Brady, Asylum Adjudication:
No Place for the INS, 20 COLUM. HuM. RTS. L. REv. 129 (1988).
6 Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 483 (1983) (Stevens, J. dissenting).
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War Brides Act of 1945, 7 which authorized admission of any such
alien spouse, not physically or mentally defective and "otherwise
admissible, ' ' 8 the Supreme Court held that she could be excluded
from the United States without a hearing, solely upon the finding
by the Attorney General that her admission would be prejudicial to
the interest of the United States. The Court pointed out that "an
alien who seeks admission to this country may not do so under any
claim of right"; that such admission "is a privilege granted by the
sovereign United States Government ... only upon such terms as
the United States shall prescribe." 9 It was not within the province
of any court to review the determination of the political branch of
the Government to exclude a given alien, and "[w]hatever the pro-
cedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien
denied entry is concerned."' 0 The Attorney General was exercising
in the instant case "the discretion entrusted to him by Congress and
the President."" His decision was based on confidential information,
and he denied the petitioner "a hearing on the matter because, in
his judgment, the disclosure of the information on which he based
that opinion would itself endanger the public security.' ' 2
In Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, the Attorney General
excluded an alien who was detained on Ellis Island. 3 Seeking a writ
of habeas corpus, after several months of detention, the alien claimed
that his continued detention violated the due process clause of the
Constitution. The Federal District Court authorized his temporary
admission on bond, and the Circuit Court affirmed the action.' 4 The
59 Stat. 659.
8Id.
9 United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950).
1o Id. at 544.
11 Id.
,2 Id. Originally, this authority to refuse a hearing could be used only during a
war or a national emergency proclaimed by the President, but later statutes allow
the exclusion of aliens on grounds connected with subversion, on the basis of
confidential information and without a hearing. See 1952 Immigration and Nationality
Act, § 235(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(c) (1988); for comment critical of the view advanced
in Knauff that courts owed extreme deference to whatever procedures Congress and
the Executive Branch decided on, see Developments in the Law: Immigration Policy
and the Rights of Aliens, 96 HARv. L. Rnv. 1286, 1322-24 ("the Court [in Knauff]
deviated sharply from fifty years of doctrinal development. The Court relied on its
earliest exclusion cases and disregarded its own more recent precedents in which it
had come to recognize a judicial responsibility to ensure that aliens seeking admission
not be subjected to unrestrained official discretion.").
13 Shaughnessy v. Unites States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
4 Id. at 209.
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Supreme Court held, however, that courts cannot retry the deter-
mination of the Attorney General. The Court held that the Congress
authorized temporary removal of aliens from ship to shore, pending
determination of their admissibility, but such shelter ashore "'shall
not be considered a landing' nor relieve the vessel of the duty to
transport back the alien if ultimately excluded."' 5 Such temporary
arrangement does not affect an alien's status; "he is treated as if
stopped at the border.' ' 6 In particular, the Court decided that the
Attorney General's continued exclusion of the alien for a period of
21 months at Ellis Island without a hearing did not constitute an
unlawful detention and he was not entitled to be released on bond;
and that such continued exclusion did not deprive him of any statutory
or constitutional right. 17 Four judges dissented, Justices Jackson and
Frankfurter pointing out that "[b]ecause the respondent has no right
of entry, does it follow that he has no rights at all?""' They concluded
that the alien's detention could be enforced only through procedures
"which meet the test of due process."' 19 Justices Black and Douglas
also thought that such "continued imprisonment without a hearing
violate[d] due process of law." ' 20 They pointed out that "individual
liberty is too highly prized in this country to allow executive officials
to imprison and hold people on the basis of information kept secret
from courts." 21
Similarly, the Mezei decision was heavily criticized in legal com-
mentaries thereon. For instance, Professor Davis, a leading authority
on administrative law, stated that the holding that a human being
may be incarcerated for life without opportunity to be heard on
charges he denies is widely considered to be one of the most shocking
decisions the Court has ever rendered. 22 Similarly, Professor Martin
remarked that this case propounded "a rather scandalous doctrine,
deserving to be distinguished, limited or ignored. ' 23
11 Id. at 215 (construing 8 U.S.C. §§ 151, 154).
16 Id.
17 Id. at 209, 215.
,S Id. at 226.
19 Id. at 227.
20 Id. at 217.
21 Id. at 218.
2 KENNETH Cu t DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 11:5 at 358 (2d ed.
1979).
23 David A. Martin, Due Process and Membership in the National Community:
Political Asylum and Beyond, 44 U. PITT. L. REv. 165, 176 (1983). The reason for
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To facilitate the admission to the United States of some undo-
cumented aliens, the Immigration and Nationality Act was amended
to provide that "[e]very alien... who may not appear to the examining
immigration officer at the port of arrival to be clearly and beyond
a doubt entitled to land shall be detained for further inquiry to be
conducted by a special inquiry officer." 24 To avoid undue hardships,
the Attorney General was authorized "in his discretion" to parole
into the United States any such alien applying for admission "under
such conditions as he may prescribe for emergent reasons or for
reasons deemed strictly in the public interest.' '25 The statute made
clear, however, that such parole shall not be regarded as an admission
of the alien, and that the alien has to be returned to custody when
in the opinion of the Attorney General the purposes of the parole
have been served. 26
As was noted by the Supreme Court in the Jean v. Nelson case,
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) had followed a
policy of general parole for most undocumented aliens (largely from
Eastern Europe, Middle East and Southeast Asia) until the late 1970s,
when large numbers of such aliens started arriving from Haiti and
Cuba.27 The Attorney General became concerned about this influx
and ordered the INS to detain without parole any immigrants who
could not present a prima facie case for admission. Without any new
statute or regulations, this policy was put immediately into operation.
A group of Haitians, incarcerated and denied parole, filed a suit
seeking a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.§ 2241 and asking
for declaratory and injunctive relief. They claimed that the change
in parole policy was made in violation of the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA), as the rulemaking procedure requiring notice and time
for comments was not observed. They also alleged that they were
this scandalousness, according to Professor Martin, is that the doctrine
affronts the tradition that our Constitution extends rights to aliens and
citizens alike. This broad reach is one of the proudest elements of our
constitutional heritage .... Moreover, we usually assume, for good reasons
brought home to us by the Court's attempt to hold otherwise in 1857 [the
Dred Scott decision], that mere membership in the human species, combined
with physical presence, is enough to call our constitutional protections fully
into play.
Id., 176-77.
2A 66 Stat. 163, 199 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (1988).
21 66 Stat. 163, 188 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (1988).
26 Id.
21 Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 849 (1985).
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being discriminated against on the basis of race and national origin,
because they were black and Haitian.28 The District Court held that
the new policy was not promulgated in accordance with the APA,
declared it "null and void," and ordered that some 1,700 incarcerated
Haitians be released. 29 The INS released them all on parole and, as
requested by the court, promulgated promptly a new rule that required
even-handed treatment and prohibited the consideration of race and
national origin in the parole decision.30 Some 100-400 Haitians con-
tinued to be held in detention, either because they violated the terms
of their parole, or arrived in Florida after the court's judgment.3'
The INS officers appealed the decision on the APA and the petitioners
appealed on the discrimination issue.12
A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed
the decision concerning the APA claim, and held that the Fifth
Amendment's equal protection guarantee applied to parole of un-
admitted aliens, and that the lower court's finding of no invidious
discrimination was erroneous (Jean 1).33 The panel ordered continued
parole for the Haitians, an injunction against discriminatory enforce-
ment of INS parole policies, and any further relief necessary "to
ensure that all aliens, regardless of their nationality or origin, are
accorded equal treatment. 3 4 The Eleventh Circuit granted a rehearing
en banc, and held that the APA claim was moot as the Government
was no longer detaining any original class members under the stricken
incarceration and parole policy (Jean 1/).35 It also held that the Fifth
SId.
2 Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. 973, 1003-04 (S.D. Fla. 1982), stay denied, Jean
v. Nelson, 683 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1982), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 711 F.2d
1455 (1 1th Cir. 1983). For background information on the evolution of this situation,
and the role the 1980 Refugee Act played in its advent, see David P. Forsythe,
Congress and Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy: The Fate of General Legislation,
9 HUM. RTS. Q. 382, 395-400 (1987); for further review of the 1980 Refugee Act,
and more focused criticism on the limits the Act placed on entry for the Haitians,
see Animesh Ghoshal & Thomas M. Crawley, Refugees and Immigrants: A Human
Rights Dilemma, 5 HUM. RTS. Q. 327 (1983); for a related case, in which the.U.S.
Coast Guard, acting pursuant to a Presidential proclamation, interdicted a Haitian
vessel on the high seas for carrying illegal aliens, see Haitian Refugee Center, Inc.
v. Gracey, 600 F. Supp. 1396 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
30 Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 850-51.
1, Id. at 851.
32 Id.
Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455, 1509 (lth Cir. 1983).
Id. at 1509-10.
35 Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 962 (1lth Cir. 1984), reh. denied, 733 F.2d 908
(11th Cir. 1984), aff'd 472 U.S. 846 (1985).
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Amendment did not apply to the consideration of unadmitted aliens
for parole, as the Attorney General was granted by the statute dis-
cretionary authority to discriminate on the basis of national origin
in parole decisions.16 Nevertheless, on the basis not of the law but
of the revised INS parole regulations which require parole decisions
to be made without regard to race or national origin, the en banc
court remanded the case to the District Court to ascertain whether
lower-level INS officials "have abused their discretion by discrimi-
nating on the basis of national origin in violation of facially neutral
instructions from their superiors. 3 7 The District Court was to ensure
that the INS had exercised its broad discretion in an individualized
and nondiscriminatory manner.38
Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners contended that this case
did not implicate the authority of the Congress, the President, or
the Attorney General, but was limited to challenging the power of
low-level politically unresponsive government officials whose actions
violated not only federal statutes but also the directions of the Pres-
ident and the Attorney General, both of whom provided for a policy
of non-discriminatory enforcement (Jean II1). 39 The petitioners asked
for "declaratory and injunctive relief," to be ordered by the Supreme
Court on the basis of the Fifth Amendment. 40 The Supreme Court
held that there was no need to consider the constitutional issues, as
the matter could be solved through the application of the relevant
statutes and regulations, and affirmed the en banc judgment man-
dating the District Court to determine whether the lower INS officials
have made individualized determinations and exercised their broad
discretion under the statutes and regulations without regard to race
or national origin. 4 1
36 Id. at 963.
37 Id.
11 Id. at 978-79.
39 Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. at 853.
- Id. at 854.
41 Id. at 857. The Court's reluctance to deal with any constitutional aspects is
indicative of its traditional reticence in the immigration field. For explanation, see
Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1
(1984)
Immigration has long been a maverick, a wild card, in our public law.
Probably no other area of American law has been so radically insulated
and divergent from those fundamental norms of constitutional right, ad-
ministrative procedure, and judicial role that animate the rest of our legal
system. In a legal firmament transformed by revolutions in due process
1991]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
Justice Marshall (in a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Brennan
joined) severely criticized this opinion for refusing to decide the basic
issue whether unadmitted aliens who were detained at various federal
facilities pending the disposition of their asylum claims "may invoke
the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause to challenge the Government's failure to release them tem-
porarily on parole." ' 42 In his view, the Court should have held that
the petitioners had "a Fifth Amendment right to parole decisions
free from invidious discrimination based on race or national origin." 3
He pointed out that in a brief filed by the Government when the
case was before the en banc Court of Appeals, the contention was
made that "the Executive is not precluded from drawing nationality-
based distinctions, for Congress has delegated the full breadth of its
parole and detention authority to the Attorney General," and the
argument was also made that "Congress knows how to prohibit
nationality-based distinctions when it wants to do so. In the absence
of such an express prohibition, it should be presumed that the broad
delegation of authority encompasses the power to make nationality-
based distinctions."" Justice Marshall also pointed out that there was
no evidence that the Attorney General had in any fashion narrowed
the discretion of lower INS officials to take race and national origin
into account in making parole decisions. 41
Justice Marshall emphasized the need for excludable aliens to enjoy
Fifth Amendment protections. 46 Ironically, when an alien detained at
the border is criminally prosecuted, he enjoys at trial all of the
protections that the Constitution provides to criminal defendants, but
as soon as he has completed serving the sentence for his crime, he
is supposed to lose such protections.4 7 He also pointed out that the
Court made clear in Plyler v. Doe that under a parallel provision of
the Fourteenth Amendment an alien, whatever his status under the
immigration laws, "is surely a 'person' in any ordinary sense of that
term," and is entitled under that Amendment to be protected against
and equal protection doctrine and by a new conception of judicial role,
immigration law remains the realm in which government authority is at the
zenith, and individual entitlement is at the nadir.
41 Id. at 858.
43 Id.
- Id. at 863.
41 Id. at 863-64.
46 Id. at 873.
47 Id.
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any deprivation of "life, liberty or property.''" Justice Marshall
pointed out that in some early cases on which the Government relied,
security considerations were involved and a temporary parole could
have resulted in a renewed threat to national security (e.g., sabotage
or espionage), but that the petitioners were being detained only be-
cause the government had "not yet performed its statutory duty to
evaluate their applications for admission." 49 In performing that duty,
the Government may not discriminate on the basis of race or national
origin. 0
While Justice Marshall relied here on the Constitution as the source
of the non-discrimination and equal protection rules, it may be added
that in recent years this broad interpretation of the rule has been
strengthened by the acceptance by the United States of the Charter
of the United Nations, in which it pledged to promote "respect for
and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion."'" As the
Court has done in other cases involving protection of human rights,
it should be guided here by "civilized standards of decency, ' 5 2 as
evidenced by many international instruments relating to human rights
generally or specifically to refugees and seekers of asylum. They
provide useful guidelines for an enlightened interpretation of the Fifth
Amendment's provision protecting a person's liberty.
The other case, which I would like to discuss, is even more pathetic
than the case of the Haitians. It started with a great humanitarian
gesture. On April 14, 1980, President Carter announced that, because
of "great humanitarian needs," up to 3,500 Cubans would be ad-
mitted to the United States, if they otherwise qualify as refugees. 3
After an airlift of these refugees was suspended by Cuba, a flotilla
of small boats (the "Freedom Flotilla") started to ply the sea between
Mariel Harbor in Cuba and Florida, bringing over more than 100,000
Cubans, most of whom did not have the proper documents to enter
48 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982), cited in Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. at
875. For comment on Plyler and the development of constitutional jurisprudence
with respect to undocumented aliens, see Developments in the Law: Immigration
Policy and the Rights of Aliens, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1286, 1445-57 (1983).
41 Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. at 877.
10 Id. at 881-82.
51 U.N. CHARTER Arts. 55-56.
12 For the evolution of this doctrine, see Louis B. Sohn, Keynote Address [Human
Rights:] Proposals for the Future, 20 GA. J. INT'L & Comrp. L. 413 (1990).
11 45 Fed. Reg. 28,079 (Apr. 14, 1980).
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the United States legally. 54 Nevertheless, after being screened by U.S.
government officials, most of them were immediately paroled into
the United States by the Attorney General. 5 Some 1800 Cubans were,
however, refused parole and were finally detained in the Atlanta
Federal Penitentiary; others were detained in various penitentiaries
around the country. 56 Some of these Cubans were never paroled
because they were mentally incompetent or were guilty of serious
crimes committed in Cuba before the boatlift. 57 A second group
consisted of persons who were originally paroled but whose parole
was subsequently revoked, usually because they had been convicted
in the United States of a felony or serious misdemeanor.5" Those in
the second group, after having served their sentence, were sent to
the Atlanta Penitentiary for further detention.5 9 Some of them, how-
ever, were guilty only of minor offenses, such as driving under the
influence; some were only charged with a crime; others had their
parole revoked for noncriminal parole violations. 60 As many of them
had lived for several years in American society, on entering the
penitentiary they often left behind wives and children who were
American citizens .6
Two groups of cases, one in Kansas and one in Georgia, reached
different results with respect to the right of the detained Cubans to
be freed. 62 Pedro Rodriguez-Fernandez, prior to arrival in the United
States, was convicted in Cuba several times by a military tribunal
for minor thefts and an attempted burglary. 63 After an immigration
judge determined that he was excludable, he was detained, pending
14 See Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 622 F. Supp. 887, 891 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
55 Id.
56 Id.
17 Id. at 893.
51 Id. at 895.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 895 n.12.
61 Id.
Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 789 (D. Kan. 1980), aff'd sub.
nom., Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981); Fernandez-
Roque v. Smith, 567 F. Supp. 1115 (N.D. Ga. 1983), rev'd, 734 F.2d 576 (11th Cir
1984), later proceeding Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 600 F. Supp. 1500 (N.D. Ga.
1985), later proceeding Garcia-Mir v. Smith, 469 U.S. 1311 (1985), and rev'd Garcia-
Mir v. Smith, 766 F.2d1470 (l1th Cir. 1985), later proceeding Fernandez-Roque v.
Smith, 622 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. Ga. 1985), stay granted in part, stay denied in part,
motion denied Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 781 F.2d 1450 (11th Cir. 1986), later proceeding
788 F.2d 1446 (11 th Cir. 1986), cert. denied Ferrer-Mazorra v. Meese, 479 U.S. 889
(1986), and cert. denied Marquez-Medina v. Meese, 475 U.S. 1022 (1986).
"3 Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 789 (D. Kan. 1980).
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deportation, at the United States Penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kan-
sas, a maximum security prison, where more than 200 Cubans were
confined in more severe conditions than the other inmates. 64 The
United States authorities (INS and the Department of State) were
unable to carry out the order of deportation and were even unable
to speculate as to a date of departure. Cuba did not respond to U.S.
diplomatic notes on the subject and no other country had been
contacted about possibly accepting the petitioner. 65 His attorneys
contended that this confinement without bail and without having been
charged with or convicted of a crime was cruel and unusual punish-
ment in contravention of the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Con-
stitution, and a violation of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause. 66
The court felt obliged to follow the precedents that made clear
that excludable aliens, "due to a time-honored legal fiction are not
recognized under the law as having entered our borders"; and that
"these nonentrants customarily have not enjoyed the panoply of rights
guaranteed to citizens and alien entrants by our Constitution. '67 On
the other hand, "it has also long been established that the discre-
tionary judgment of a political branch of government is judicially
reviewable in a federal court on a writ of habeas corpus for abuse
of discretion."" While temporary detention has long been approved
by the Supreme Court, "the issue actually before the Court is whether
or not an excluded alien may be detained in a maximum security
prison indefinitely awaiting deportation by the INS or the State
Department." 69 Indeterminate detention of an excludable alien was
not authorized by statute or federal regulation, the court pointed
out, 70 and in the parallel case of deportable aliens, a statute limited
detention to six months, which indicated Congressional disapproval
of detention "beyond the reasonable time necessary to execute a final
order of deportation." '7' In several cases, the courts have held that
"approximately two to four months was a reasonable period to detain
an alien pending deportation efforts. "72 The court declared that "in-
4Id.
6Id.
66Id.
67 Id. at 790.
Id. at 791.
6' Id.
70 Id. at 792.
7, Id. at 793 (construing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(c)).
72 Id. at 793.
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determinate detention of petitioner in a maximum security prison
pending unforeseeable deportation constitutes arbitrary detention." 71
It pointed out also that "international law secures to petitioner the
right to be free of arbitrary detention and that his right is being
violated." ' 74 It held, accordingly, that "even though the indeterminate
detention of an excluded alien cannot be said to violate the United
States Constitution or our statutory law, it is judicially remedial as
a violation of international law." 71 The court decided that the pe-
titioner should be released in ninety days, and if the arbitrary detention
was not terminated by then, the court would "grant the writ of
habeas corpus and order petitioner released on parole. 76
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit noted that the petitioner by that time had been confined in
a maximum security prison, some of the time in solitary confinement,
for more than a year, under conditions as severe as those applied to
the worst criminals. 7 The court agreed that the petitioner could invoke
no constitutional protection against his exclusion from the United
States. 78 As deportation was not penal, normal criminal rights were
not applicable and he could be arrested by administrative warrant
issued without the order of a magistrate. The situation of the petitioner
would have been quite different if he had been accused of a crime
against the laws of the United States, as he would have been entitled
to the constitutional protections of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 7
9
The court analogized detention pending deportation to incarceration
pending trial; it was justifiable only as a necessary, temporary meas-
ure. 80 The court pointed out that "[d]ue process is not a static concept,
it undergoes evolutionary change to take into account current notions
71 Id. at 795.
7, Id.
71 Id. at 798.
76 Id. at 800.
77 Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1385 (10th Cir. 1981). For
comment on this case and on the possible use of international customary law (in
particular, human rights law), see Richard B. Bilder, Integrating International Human
Rights Law into Domestic Law-U.S. Experience, 4 Hous. J. INT'L L. 1 (1981);
see also David F. Klein, A Theory for the Application of the Customary International
Law of Human Rights by Domestic Courts, 13 YALE J. INT'L L. 332 (1988); Richard
B. Lillich, The Constitution and International Human Rights, 83 AM. J. INT'L L.
851 (1989).
78 Rodriguez-Fernandez, 654 F.2d at 1386.
79 Id.
90 Id. at 1387.
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of fairness." 8' As the Supreme Court has relied on principles of
international law in its decisions upholding the plenary power of
Congress over exclusion and deportation of aliens, it seemed proper
to the court "to consider international law principles for notions of
fairness as to propriety of holding aliens in detention. 8 2 It pointed
out that no principle of international law is more fundamental than
"the concept that human beings should be free from arbitrary im-
prisonment," and cited as evidence several international instruments.83
When some 3,000 aliens from iron-curtain countries could not be
deported to their countries of origin in the 1950s, Congress inserted
several provisions which insured that they could not be detained
longer than six months.84 The court found that it would be consistent
with these provisions, to read the provision for temporary detention
in the exclusion statutes as permitting detention only "during the
proceedings to determine eligibility to enter and, thereafter, during
a reasonable period of negotiations for their return to the country
of origin or to the transporter that brought them here." ' 85 After such
time, upon the application of the incarcerated alien, he should be
released. 86 The court added that this construction would be "consistent
with accepted international law principles that individuals are entitled
to be free of arbitrary imprisonment. 87 The main finding of the
court, however, was that, without relying directly on international
law, it could dispose of the appeal by construing the applicable statutes
to require the petitioner's release at this time. 8
It may be noted that before this case was finished, Rodriguez-
Fernandez was transferred to the Atlanta Penitentiary,89 and it was
there that the fate of a large number of detained Cubans had to be
decided. 90 After a series of decisions disposing of various issues both
jurisdictional and substantive, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit decided that these aliens did not have a constitutionally-
protected liberty interest in parole arising from the due process clause
11 Id. at 1388.
12 Id. (construing Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893)).
83 Id.
"4 Id. at 1389.
85 Id.
66 Id. at 1389-90.
11 Id. at 1390.
8I Id.
9 Id. at 1384-85.
90 Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 734 F.2d 576, 578 (11th Cir. 1984).
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of U.S. Constitution (i.e. a "core" liberty interest).91 On further
remand, Judge Shoob was asked to consider whether these plaintiffs
had a federally created liberty interest in parole, and whether their
continued detention violated international law. 92 On the first issue,
the court held
that those class members who were not mental incompetents and
who had not committed serious crimes in Cuba came to this country
in response to an invitation from the President of the United States;
that this invitation created for them a protected liberty interest in
continued parole; and that because of this liberty interest, each
member of this class may be detained only if a finding is made... that
the person is likely to abscond, to pose a risk to the national security,
or to pose a serious and significant threat to persons or property
within the United States.93
As far as international law was concerned, the court relied on the
fact that "[e]ven the government admits that customary international
law of human rights contains at least a general principle prohibiting
prolonged arbitrary detention." 94 It noted also that customary inter-
national law prohibits "indefinite detention of plaintiffs, without
periodic hearings establishing that the continued detention of each
class member is reasonably necessary for early deportation or for the
protection of society from one proven to be dangerous." 95 It accepted,
however, the government's contention that an exception provided for
in the Paquete Habana case allows a "controlling executive act" to
prevail over a rule of customary international law; 96 that in this case
it was the Attorney General who has directed the plaintiff's indefinite
detention; that "the President has the authority to ignore our coun-
try's obligations arising under customary international law, and plain-
tiffs failed to establish that the Attorney General does not share in
this power when he directs the detention of unadmitted aliens"; and
that, therefore, customary international law did not apply in this
case.Y
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit noted
the Supreme Court's decisions which have held that "excludable aliens
91 Id. at 582.
92 Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 622 F.2d 887, 890 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
91 Id. at 901.
9' Id. at 902.
91 Id. at 903.
" Id. at 902 (citing The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
w Id. at 902-03.
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND EXCLUDABLE ALIENS
are largely outside the mantle of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment." It decided that the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate
the existence of any significant restriction on the discretion of Ex-
ecutive Branch actions, and reversed to that extent the trial court's
judgment. 98 As for the international law question, the court held that
international law does not control here, because there was a con-
trolling executive act "in the Attorney General's termination of the
status review plan which envisaged a series of hearings and in his
decisions to incarcerate indefinitely pending efforts to deport.'' 99 The
court added that its previous decision in the Jean v. Nelson (Jean
I) case'00 that an indefinitely incarcerated alien "could not challenge
his continued detention without a hearing" constituted a "controlling
judicial decision" meeting the test of The Paquete Habana.01 Con-
sequently the court held that "the appellees stated no basis for relief
under international law because any rights there extant have been
extinguished by controlling acts of the executive and judicial
branches." 0 2
This decision is, of course, disconcerting,0 3 but as it disposed of
the case by invoking a peripheral issue, it does not detract from the
fact that in both series of cases discussed here there has been a partly
successful attempt to use standards of international law to throw
light on the need for more modern interpretation of the due process
and equal protection clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the Constitution.
98 Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1450, 1453 (1lth Cir. 1986).
99 Id. at 1454.
100 Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957 (lth Cir. 1984), aff'd. 472 U.S. 846 (1985).
101 Garcia-Mir, 788 F.2d at 1455.
102 Id.
103 For critical comments on the Garcia-Mir decision, see Agora: May the President
Violate Customary International Law? 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 913, 936 (1986) ("[G]arcia-
Mir misinterpreted and misapplied The Paquete Habana ... It took the view that
the President-and the Attorney General- had power 'to disregard international
law in the service of domestic needs.' There is no such principle."); see also Agora:
May the President Violate Customary International Law? (cont. "d), 81 Am. J. INT'L
L. 371 (1987). It may also be noted that as a result of prison riots by the Cubans
in Oakdale, Louisiana, and in Atlanta, Georgia, in 1987, the U.S. Government set
up new hearings and an appeals process to determine which of the 3,800 detainees
will be paroled, further detained or deported. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 212.12-212.13 (1990).
Nevertheless, in 1989 there were still about 2,500 detainees being held in 23 federal
prisons throughout the country. Many of them have been detained for more than
five years, and they still are treated more strictly than ordinary prisoners. See Miles
Corwin, Cuban 'Detainees' From Mariel Boat Lift; 2,500 Prisoners of U.S. Face
No Charges, Los ANGELES TImEs, Aug. 27, 1989, Part I, at 1.
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As Judge Rogers eloquently pointed out in Fernandez v. Wilkinson,
"No country in the world has been more vocal in favor of human
rights [than the United States]. It would not befit our history as a
guarantor of human rights for our own citizens, to decline to protect
unadmitted aliens against arbitrary governmental infringement of their
fundamental human rights."0'4
-0, Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. at 799.
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